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RECALL OF J1DGES.
RECALL OF JUDGES.
The "Committee to Oppose the Judicial Recall" at the 1918
meeting of the American Bar Association, rendered a report
which stated that:
"So far as concerns either the enactment or enforcement
of legislative measures providing in terms and directly for
judicial recall, either in the form of recall of judges or of
judicial decisions, judicial recall many now be viewed as
generally understood and therefore discredited through the
country, and to the extent that the menace of judicial recall
so far as direct legislation is concerned, is a thing of the
past."
The recall of judges for cause has for years received ex-
tended attention at the hands of lawyers, editors, legislators
and publicists, and has generally been condemned. The recall
of judges for no cause at all has received no attention. Yet
recall without cause flourishes throughout the country. It is
not designated by the name "recall." The operation of a
much cherished method in the selection of judges directly re-
sults in a very great number of cases in the recall of judges
without cause.
In most of the states of the Union, judges are nominated at
party primaries or conventions. In nearly all our states,
judges are elected at regular state or national elections as can-
didates on party tickets. The Judicial candidate, with rare
exceptions stands or falls with his party.
A few examples will clearly demonstrate the perniciousness
of the system. In 1912, Judge X . , who had served his
term as judge in a Western State, to the complete satisfaction
of the bar and the public, suffered defeat, together with the
rest of his party ticket. He was thus removed from the bench,
not because of anything that he had done, but because the
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voters in his jurisdiction did not like what President Taft had
done.
Had Judge X....-been up before the electorate alone at
an election called to decide the single issue, "Shall Judge
....... be retained in office or shall he be recalled?", he
would, undoubtedly have been retained by a practically unani-
mous vote.
Judge Y._... in 1916, after demonstrating rare ability,
industry and fitness for judicial office, was defeated for re-
election in one of our central cities, not because of anything
he had done, but because the voters in his jurisdiction did
not like what Mr. Wilson had done. Thus a Judge whose
record had won universal commendation was removed from the
bench because of no fault of his, but because of alleged faults
found with the head of the national party ticket which he
happened to be on. He was recalled, not for cause, but in
despite of the most urgent reasons for retaining him on
the bench. Had there been framed and submitted at a
special election, the single issue: "Shall Judge Y. ....... be
recalled or retainedp", unquestionably the vote would have
been overwhelmingly in favor of retaining him.
Judge Z_._.in 1920 was defeated for re-election. He was
indorsed by the Bar Association, his record had won unani-
mous approval. But the voters of his district did not approve
of President Wilson's position in the League of Nations and
so the whole ticket was defeated. And yet if the single ques-
tion had been submitted to the voters at a separate election:
"Shall Judge, Z-continue in office, or be recalled from
office," the vote would have been overwhelmingly in favor of
continuing him in office.
Our ballot is now long, and the road seems even longer to
the short ballot. Our judges are elected on partisan tickets,
and this inevitably means that the faithful, fearless judge at
the end of his term must run the gauntlet of party boss in
convention or primary to obtain the nomination, and if he
escapes forcible recall in that quarter, he must suffer his
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name to be submitted at an election, where partisan political
considerations control to the complete obliteration of the one
consideration vitally affecting his career, and the public inter-
est in his candidacy for the office of judge, viz. his qualifica-
tions and his record on the bench.
The hazard which he runs is the hazard of the recall without
cause, or rather for causes not even remotely connected with
his fitness to discharge the duties of the office of judge.
Do we not have in the stereotyped form of partisan judicial
electors, a most vicious variety of the recall of judges ?
There is scarcely a lawyer at the bar who would not welcome
an appointive judiciary if he felt that Governors, in appoint-
ing judges, would exercise as sound a discretion in other states
as they have exercised in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Per-
haps they would, if the responsibility were placed squarely on
their shoulders.
"But," the objection is raised, "the people would never con-
sent to surrendering control of the judiciary." And that
probably is true. Yet is it not possible to substitute a fair
and just control in place of the purely arbitrary, capricious,
blind and disastrous control, now exercised through partisan
elections, where judges are recalled in the midst of careers
giving universal satisfaction-recalled not for something
they have done, but for something the presidential nominee or
some other partisan candidate on their ticket has done? This
present supposed "control" by the people in actual practice
rarely ever results in any control at all by the people, but
usually, if at all, by the politicians.
Suppose State Constitutions were so amended that Govern-
ors appointed judges for a term of twenty years (or even fif-
teen years) with the power reserved by the people, after two
years of the term had elapsed, to recall for cause? A recall
election conducted for cause stated, held separate and apart
from any other election, would present a clear-cut issue, and
with ample opportunity for consideration of the issue, it would
undoubtedly result in the vindication of any fair judge. In all
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probability such elections would prove to be as rare as im-
peachment proceedings under existing methods. Perhaps
the people would really prefer a control of this character to
the present method of electing for short terms, and then com-
pelling the judge who is willing to continue on the bench, to
run the gauntlet of politicial bosses and partisan issues in
perilous campaigns for renomination and re-election. Un-
questionably Governors thus directly confronted with the re-
sponsibility, would appoint high-grade men to the bench. The
Judges in two years would be able to demonstrate their
ability. Then if the recall were invoked against JudgeX......
or.Judge Y- or Judge Z -, it would for cauise stated,
and the bar and the public would be able to meet the issue
squarely and overwhelm any attempt to recall a just and
fearless judge.
A fair and courageous Judge need not then hesitate to
do his full duty through any apprehension as to politician or
boss lying in wait for him at the next convention or primary.
A faithful Judge would be able to proceed with his work, un-
harassed by concern as to the effect upon his future of fear-
less decisions. He would know that his continuance in office
could not be made to depend upon undisclosed personal pre-
judice, partisan passion or whim, or secret political control
or favor. He would not be the subject of popular election
except upon a single issue based upon his own record, and the
issue so framed would of necessity be fought out and decided
upon the basis of the cause stated, and upon that basis alone.
The President or Congress might then do as they saw fit,
without imperiling throughout the different states in the
Union, the stability of the bench or placing in jeopardy the
judicial career of able men at the point of their greatest
usefulness.
Might it not be well, then to consider the propriety of the
abolition of the form of judicial recall, (not so denominated
but so working out in actual practice, now in force in nearly
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all the states, the compulsory judicial recall, the judicial re-
cal without cause, without rhyme or reason, and consider the
substitution for it of a method of stabilizing our judiciary
through the system of an appointive judiciary, providing long
terms, reserving to the people the right to exercise, after two
years, the power of recall for cause stated and only for cause
stated?
x. Y. Z.
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